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A Practitioner’s Guide to Wiretaps in Public
Corruption Investigations
The nonconsensual interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications of
targets in criminal investigations1 is a powerful law enforcement tool and can be
used to great effect in many cases, including public corruption cases. Indeed,
particularly in cases where wrongful behavior is covert – as is often the case
when public officials are involved -- there is great value to evidence that allows
prosecutors to use the defendant’s own recorded words against him in the
courtroom. But there are many factors to consider before using this laborintensive, long-term tool in your corruption investigation, and once a decision
has been made to seek a wiretap, there are several legal issues that may arise.
This paper sets forth some factors you should take into account when
considering a wiretap, and precautions you should take to ensure you are in the
best possible position for litigation following the wiretap, especially as it relates
to a public corruption case. It also includes a sample federal wiretap application
affidavit, and sample instructions for minimization.2

I.

Appendices:
Appendix 1:
Sample wiretap application
from United States v. Skelos.
Appendix 2:
Sample minimization
instructions for oral and wire
communications.
Appendix 3:
State-by-state wiretap
requirements.

Is this the Right Case for a Wiretap?

Before discussing the legal issues relating to wiretaps, it is necessary to assess whether your investigation is the right
case for a wiretap. In doing so, ask these questions:
1. Do we have the money?
On December 31, 2015, the United States Courts system released its annual wiretap report for the year.3 The
average cost of a wiretap was $42,216 and the most expensive wiretap cost $1,363,192, which involved a 390-day
narcotics investigation in Rockland County, New York.4 Overall, 4,148 wiretaps were authorized in federal and state
courts, and, from these, 3,297 extensions were requested and authorized, more than a 79 percent renewal rate.5 You
must ensure that your agency has the financial resources to be able to support a wiretap, and that it can continue
the investigation in the event of an extension of the initial tap.
2. Do we have the manpower?
An eavesdropping investigation involves a team of investigators that will need to monitor the wiretapped phone
lines at all times. That means that someone will always need to be at the plant, where conversations are intercepted
and recorded. Simultaneously, there will need to be an investigative team out in the field performing physical
surveillance for at least some of the time the wiretap is live. Monitoring a phone 24 hours a day for 30 days at a time
can be a huge drain on man power. You must ensure that your agency has enough investigators to carry on an
investigation like this. These issues become even more important if a foreign language is involved and translators
must be utilized.
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3. Is this a wiretap worthy case?
Of the 4,148 wiretaps issued in 2015,
approximately 3,292 of them (79 percent) were for
In deciding whether to engage in a wiretap
narcotics cases.6 The other 21 percent included
investigation, think of whether the amount of
homicide and assault (221 wiretaps), racketeering
(141), conspiracy (220), larceny, theft and robbery resources being used to investigate is worthy of
(40), corruption (10), and gambling (33).7 There
the crime or target(s) you are seeking to
were 191 other cases outside of these major
eventually prosecute.
categories. So, for the most part, wiretap cases are
used to investigate major offenses.8 In deciding
whether to engage in a wiretap investigation, think of whether the amount of resources being used to investigate is
worthy of the crime or target(s) you are seeking to eventually prosecute. In a public corruption case, this may be an
easy call with an elected official, but it should be considered, particularly with lower-level public officials or
employees.

II.

Legal Framework

If you have determined that a wiretap is practical in your public corruption investigation, then it’s time to consider
the legal foundation of an eavesdropping warrant. Eavesdropping warrants are a variant of general search warrants,
and are thus governed by the limitations of a search warrant.9 Title III, like a general search warrant, requires that an
eavesdropping warrant only be issued upon a showing of probable cause. 10 It goes several steps further by requiring
or authorizing the following:







The application must include the name of the target (if known) and the type of communication that will be
intercepted.11
The statute enumerates the investigative, judicial and enforcement agencies that are allowed to seek, review
and execute eavesdropping warrants.12
The affiant on the application is required to state how “normal investigative procedures have been tried and
have failed or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”13
The authorizing judge has discretion to direct investigators to update the judge on the investigation at
whatever intervals the judge requires.14
The application must specifically state the time period for eavesdropping.15
The statute states that eavesdropping can continue beyond the originally authorized time period, but only
under certain circumstances.16

These requirements apply to all wiretap applications, not just those in public corruption investigations. As discussed
in greater detail below, however, given the likely publicity that your public corruption case will generate, you will
want to ensure that you scrupulously follow these requirements and are ready to defend you and your law
enforcement partners’ actions every step of the way. Litigation over adherence to these requirements is more likely
to occur and to be more contentious in a corruption case than in an average wiretap case.
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Once a judge has authorized an eavesdropping warrant, there are several other requirements to keep in mind:





The statute specifies how intercepted conversations are to be preserved, safeguarded and stored.17
The statute states what investigators must do in the case of intercepting a non-pertinent conversation,
commonly referred to as minimization.18
The statute states the circumstances under which intercepted conversations may be disclosed or used as
evidence.19
The statute lays out notice requirements for interceptees.20

Again, you will want to ensure strict adherence with all of these requirements in your corruption investigation.

III. Legal Considerations
Litigation arising from wiretaps comes from various areas of the statute. Here are some of the most important,
generally speaking:
1. Exhaustion/Necessity
Every eavesdropping warrant is required to have a statement as to other investigative techniques used prior to the
submission of the wiretap according to 18 USC § 2518(1)(c).21 The statement must include why the procedures tried
have failed, or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous.22 Investigative
techniques to exhaust before an eavesdropping warrant becomes necessary include:23


















Physical surveillance
Public record checks
Pen registers
Trap and Traces
GPS tracking
Analysis of toll records
Trash seizures
Financial investigation

Undercover agents
Search warrants
Controlled purchases
Confidential Informants
Covert cameras
Tracking devices
Subscriber information
Mail cover

It is important that statements of necessity not become “boilerplate assertions,” “unsupported by specific facts
relevant to the particular circumstances of this case.”24 This was the holding from the Ninth Circuit, which
suppressed an eavesdropping warrant on these grounds in United States v. Blackmon.25 In that case, investigators
began eavesdropping on a target, and through this wiretap developed probable cause to begin eavesdropping on the
defendant’s phone.26 However, the necessity section of the eavesdropping warrant from the initial target’s phone
was, with the exception of a few alterations, “a duplicate” of the defendant’s necessity section.27 The Blackmon court
made specific note that “no further investigative efforts were attempted in between the application” for the initial
wiretap and the defendant’s wiretap.28 Thus, the Court suppressed the wiretap because the necessity section of the
eavesdropping warrant contained “generalized statements that would be true of any narcotics investigation.”29
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2. Official must authorize the application
18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(d) and § 2516(1) require all Title III applications to name the identity of the authorizing
individual in a wiretap, and also limits the pool of Department of Justice officials who are empowered to authorize
the application. This was the subject of litigation in United States v. Giordano. In this case, investigators obtained
an eavesdropping warrant on a narcotics trafficker, which was not authorized by the attorney general or one of his
designated assistants. Instead, the attorney general’s executive assistant authorized the eavesdropping warrant, and
in suppressing evidence from the wiretap, the Supreme Court held that an executive assistant’s authorization was
inconsistent with the language and legislative history of Title III.
3. Minimizing Non-Pertinent and Privileged Calls
a. Pertinent vs. Non-Pertinent
In any eavesdropping investigation, there will be both pertinent and non-pertinent conversations intercepted. Title
III only authorizes the interception of calls that are “pertinent” to the criminal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)
accounts for this by requiring that an investigation be “conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter.” There isn’t a specific bright-line rule on
proper minimization, which has led to substantial litigation over this part of the statute.
In Scott v. United States, investigators intercepted conversations about a conspiracy to import and distribute
narcotics. Approximately 40 percent of the intercepted calls were narcotics-related. However, investigators listened
to all calls, which included non-pertinent conversations between the target and her mother. In ruling that
suppression was not appropriate in this case, the Court declined to assess the subjective intent of the investigator,
instead ruling that there would need to be an “objective assessment of the actions of the officer or agent
conducting the surveillance in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time, without regard to
his underlying intent or motivation.” Objectively, the Court ruled, each recorded call could contain evidence of
criminality, and this analysis would need to be done on a case-by-case basis.
United States v. North was one such case where the Fifth Circuit used an objective analysis to suppress evidence on
the grounds that investigators did not follow minimization requirements. In North, prior to eavesdropping on the
defendant’s phone, investigators were given minimization instructions to initially listen to the conversation to
determine whether it was pertinent or non-pertinent. If it was deemed non-pertinent, the investigator would cease
monitoring the call, and then spot check the call to determine whether or not the conversation had veered toward
criminality. However, in one intercepted call, the defendant admitted more than an hour into the conversation that
he had narcotics hidden in his car. The defendant did not have any narcotics-related conversations for
approximately an hour, and investigators minimized only eight times for an average of less than one minute each
time. Based on this information, investigators arrested the defendant and charged him with possession of cocaine.
In ruling to suppress the evidence derived from
the wiretap, the court held that it was not
objectively reasonable for agents to listen in for Perhaps the most important of these categories in
nearly one hour to a conversation that did not turn public corruption investigations is the attorneyto criminal matters until the last few minutes.

client privilege, because so many public officials
are lawyers themselves, and consult lawyers in
a. Privileged Communications
connection with their professional duties.
A subcategory of non-pertinent calls is privileged

communications, such as those between attorneyclient, parishioner-clergyman, doctor-patient, and
husband-wife. Perhaps the most important of these categories in public corruption investigations is the attorney5

client privilege, because so many public officials are lawyers themselves, and consult lawyers in connection with
their professional duties. The consequences of improper minimization of these kinds of communications were
specifically addressed in United States v. Renzi. In that case, investigators were given the following instructions
regarding attorney-client communications:
Unless otherwise addressed in this memorandum, never knowingly listen to or record a confidential
conversation between a person and his or her attorney when other parties are not present. Anytime that an
attorney or law office employee is a party to a conversation, call the agent supervising the interception. . . If it
is determined that a conversation involving an attorney constitutes confidential legal consultation of any kind,
notify the agent supervising the interception, shut off the monitor and stop recording.

In Renzi, investigators failed to minimize 37 attorney-client conversations, which the District Court held went
beyond the scope of what was authorized by the wiretap. The court also took issue with the government concealing
from the court in its reports that they were recording these kinds of conversations, even if it was subject to taint
team review. Investigators also failed to identify as privileged and seal attorney-client calls that it inadvertently
intercepted during the wiretap in violation of the Department of Justice’s Electronic Surveillance Manual. The
court, viewing the conduct in totality, suppressed the entire wiretap as opposed to merely suppressing the privileged
calls.
In another case, however, dealing with the spousal privilege, the court decided against suppressing the whole
wiretap. In United States v. Goffer, investigators on a securities fraud wiretap investigation were given a
minimization packet, which included the following instructions:
There is also a privilege concerning communications between spouses. You are to discontinue monitoring if
you discover that you are intercepting a personal communication solely between husband and wife. If it
appears that a third person is present during this communication, however, the communication is not
privileged. So, too, if the communication deals not with private matters between husband and wife, but
instead with ongoing as opposed to past violations of law, it is not a privileged communication.

The District Court found that 18 conversations between the defendant and his wife were not properly minimized.
Of these 18, three specifically stood out to the court as “particularly egregious,” bordering on “voyeuristic” where
investigators listened to deeply personal and intimate discussions about their marriage. The court characterized the
lack of minimization in relation to these calls “disgraceful,” yet declined to suppress the entire wiretap. The court
found that, on the whole, the wiretap was professionally conducted and generally well-executed, and that later in the
investigation, calls between the defendant and his spouse were minimized within the first ten seconds of the
conversation.
Thus, if your investigators do not minimize properly, the use of all or part of your wiretap at trial may be in
jeopardy. Instructing your monitoring agents in this area is key to avoiding problems in this area. Sample
minimization instructions are included in the appendix to this paper.
4. Sealing Requirements
Immediately upon expiration of the authorized wiretapping period, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) requires the recording be
made available to the judge and sealed under his directions in order to preserve the integrity of the evidence. In a
case where the recording has not been properly placed under seal, the government must provide a “satisfactory
explanation” for its failure to comply with the sealing requirement. In United States v. Cline, the government had a
one-week delay in sealing recordings in a narcotics trafficking case because of the judge’s court schedule. In
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upholding the defendant’s conviction, the Tenth Circuit found that there was no evidence of bad faith or
tampering, nor did it find any tactical advantage in favor of the government as part of the delay.
5. Notice Requirements
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) requires that named interceptees, as well as parties to intercepted communications in the
judge’s discretion, be given notice that their calls were intercepted within 90 days. A violation of this part of the
statute does not necessarily result in suppression of the wiretap, however. In United States v. Principie, investigators
arrested several targets as a result of an eavesdropping investigation into forged United States savings bonds. The
government did not provide notice to the named target, Principie, or to an unnamed target, Slomka. In declining to
suppress the wiretap, the Second Circuit held that, on top of showing notice was not properly served within 90
days, there must be a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant. Principie could make no such showing. As it
related to Slomka, the court ruled that since Slomka was not a named target to any of the eavesdropping warrants,
notice was not required under § 2518(8)(d). Instead, it was up to the Judge’s discretion, and the court found that
not supplying notice to Slomka, who played a minor role in the conspiracy, was not an abuse of discretion.
Nearly forty years after the Principie decision, the New York State Court of Appeals issued a similar decision. In
People v. Rodriguez, the Court similarly held that suppression was not warranted after investigators failed to
properly notify defendant of the warrant until more than 90 days after it expired in violation of CPL § 700.50(3), a
similar statute to § 2518(8)(d). The court held that the defendant received notice of the warrant at arraignment, and
there was no showing of prejudice as a result of not being notified prior to arraignment.

IV. Strategic Issues to Consider in Public Corruption Wiretaps
There are numerous strategic issues specifically related to wiretaps in public corruption cases that you should
consider before moving forward with an application. First, you need to decide whose calls to intercept. In many
wiretap investigations, the ultimate target may be the obvious choice to intercept, but that may not be true in a
corruption case for a variety of reasons. For one, in many corruption cases the target will be a politician or other
high-ranking government official and many such people are lawyers, raising the specter of privilege issues that
require significant minimization. Second, a high-ranking official target may be more careful about talking on the
phone in an inculpatory manner than someone else in the target’s circle would be, making a wiretap on the
underling’s phone more fruitful. Third, it is not uncommon for the person at the top of a criminal conspiracy to let
others do the dirty work for him – this is true of public
officials as well as drug kingpins – meaning the official’s
phone may not be the best choice because he is not It is not uncommon for the person at the
personally handling all of the negotiations and
top of a criminal conspiracy to let others do
transactions involved in the crime.

the dirty work for him – this is true of
public officials as well as drug kingpins.

For example, in the investigation of New York State
Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos, prosecutors decided
to intercept the phone of Skelos’s son Adam as well as
Skelos’s own phone. As it turned out, the charged scheme centered around Dean Skelos’s solicitation of bribes in
the form of money and employment for Adam, so Adam’s phone captured vital evidence about that scheme. In
addition, Adam Skelos was much less careful about what he said on the phone than Dean Skelos was, and
prosecutors did not have to worry as much about privileged calls in connection with that interception because
Adam Skelos is not a lawyer.

7

When a lawyer’s phone is targeted extra care is required. Agents and prosecutors must make certain to identify all
individuals who call the phone or who are called by the phone, to ensure that minimization is done properly. In
advance, agents will have to identify all numbers that the targeted lawyer is likely to call that might create privilege
problems, e.g. phone numbers at the target’s law firm if he works at a firm, or his own lawyer’s numbers if he is
represented. And as with all cases, prosecutors will have to repeatedly emphasize the importance of proper
minimization to all agents and officers sitting the wire. It also may be challenging to tell the difference between legal
and political advice when a politician is consulting with his or her counsel, or when a politician’s chief of staff is
also a lawyer. These complications make staying on top of what is happening on the wire even more important than
in the average case.
Another issue that arises with targets who are public officials is the importance of ensuring that the investigation is
not, and does not appear to be, politically motivated. As far as the wiretap goes, that means that monitoring agents
will need to be particularly careful of conversations between the target and other elected or high-ranking officials,
and consider aggressively minimizing political conversations that are not obviously criminal. Regardless of the
prosecutor’s office involved in the case, whether it is the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Attorney General’s office, or a
District Attorney case, no prosecutor will want to face allegations that a case is politically motivated, and listening in
too freely to a public official’s conversations about political matters may add fuel to that fire.
For all of these reasons, it is essential to be proactive in acknowledging any minimization mistakes in your 10-day
reports and in any requests to extend the wire. To the extent there is litigation over the wiretap – which should be
expected in a public corruption case – you will want to have established that you were diligent in fixing any
problems with monitoring promptly and completely, and that you disclosed everything to the judge as soon as
practicable and before asking for an extension.

V.

Conclusion

Eavesdropping continues to be one of the most effective ways of investigating and prosecuting cases in the United
States in the right circumstances, and can be highly valuable evidence in a public corruption case. But corruption
cases have unique challenges, so remember to keep all of the above practical and legal considerations in mind
before pursuing this kind of investigation.
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Endnotes
1

See Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).

The requirements described in this paper are the federal requirements under Title III. For the most part, the requirements for a
wiretap application at the state law level are very similar, if not identical, to the requirements enumerated in the federal
wiretapping statute. However, some states narrow the scope of situations in which law enforcement officials can obtain a wiretap;
in other words, the federal law operates as a ceiling and not a floor.
2

For example, in Alaska and several other states, law enforcement officials can receive permission for a wiretap only when
probable cause for specific enumerated crimes has been shown. This is in contrast to the availability of a wiretap for any crime
that the federal statute permits (although the requirement for probable cause remains). Even more of an outlier, the state of
Montana does not have a state wiretap law at this time. Prosecutors seeking to obtain a wiretap in Montana must do so under the
federal statute in federal court.
See Wiretap Report 2015, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2015.
Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See 18 USC §§ 2518(3)(a)(b) & (d).
(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of
wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting (and outside that
jurisdiction but within the United States in the case of a mobile interception device authorized by a Federal court within such jurisdiction),
if the judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that-(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense
enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter [18 USCS § 2516];
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception;
….
(d) except as provided in subsection (11), there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire,
oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of
such offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.
10 Id.
11 See 18 USC §§ 2518(4)(a)&(c).
12 See 18 USC § 2518(4)(d).
13 See 18 USC §§ 2518(3)(c).
14 See 18 USC § 2518(6).
15 See 18 USC § 2518(1)(d).
16 See 18 USC § 2518(5).
17 See 18 USC § 2518(8)(a).
18 See 18 USC § 2518(5).
19 See 18 USC § 2518(9).
20 See 18 USC § 2518(8)(d).
21 See 18 USC § 2518(1)(c).
22 Id.
23 See Generally United States v. Penaloza-Romero 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76913 (D. Minn. 2015).
24 See United States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1206.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1211.
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